A Phenomenological Critique of Existential Feeling: Affect as Temporality by Soffer, Joshua
A Phenomenological Critique of Existential Feeling: Affect as Temporality
        Abstract:
Matthew Ratcliffe’s model of existential feelings can be seen as  a critical engagement
with perspectives common to  analytic,  theory of mind and psychological orientations
that view psychological functions such as cognition and affectivity within normative
objective propositional frameworks. Ratcliffe takes a step back from and re-situates
objective reifications within an interactive subject-object matrix inclusive of the body
and the interpersonal world. In doing so, he  turns a mono-normative thinking into a
poly-normative one, in which determinations of meaning and significance  are relative
to the changing structural coherence of felt bodily and inter-socially shaped schemes of
interaction. And yet, from the  phenomenological vantages  of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, 
Gendlin and Heidegger, Ratcliffe’s approach retains the metaphysical presupposition of  
subject-object dualism  as interacting bodies, with a separate causative glue necessary to
provide for the means of their relation. Ratcliffe  re-purposed Damasio‘s concept of
background feeling and  dressed it up in the garb of  phenomenology , but it remains a
reciprocal causal model of psychological function.
What Heidegger’s Being-in-the -World, Merleau-Ponty’s figure-background structure
of corporeal inter-subjectivity, Gendlin’s implicit intricacy  and Husserl’s reduced
transcendental ego have in common is a radicalized notion of temporality that
overcomes the split between subject and object informing Ratcliffe’s understanding of
being ‘immersed in’ and connected to a world, and thus abandons the need to posit
bodily feeling as a ‘glue’ organizing and maintaining the meaningful structure of 
consciousness of a  world.  Temporality , not the empirically causal  body, provides the
basis of affect, cognition and the organizational glue for structures of meaning.
Introduction
Matthew Ratcliffe’s model of existential feelings can be seen as  a critical engagement with
perspectives common to  analytic,  theory of mind and psychological orientations that view
psychological functions such as cognition and affectivity within normative objective
propositional frameworks in which affect is either peripheral to cognitive processes or only
directed toward internal bodily feeling.  Ratcliffe takes a step back from and re-situates objective
reifications within an interactive subject-object matrix inclusive of the body and the interpersonal
world. In doing so, he   turns a mono-normative thinking into a poly-normative one, in which
determinations of meaning and significance are oriented by the changing structural coherence of
world-directed felt bodily and inter-socially shaped schemes of interaction. 
The aim of this paper is to show that while  Ratcliffe’s existential feeling significantly transforms 
Damasio‘s concept of background feeling, in  dressing it up in the garb of  phenomenological
philosophical conceptions, he neglects to follow Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Gendlin and Heidegger
in establishing a radicalized concept of temporality as the ground of affectivity. Whereas the
above phenomenologists fuse  affect and intention within the moment of time itself as tripartite
structure of temporal becoming, Ratcliffe founds  affect and intention as distinguishable
structural aspects of a reciprocally  causal model . As a result, Ratcliffe substitutes polarizing ,
semi-arbitrary conditionings for a more intimate,  intricate and unitary process of affective-
connative meaning creation.
Existential Feeling as Global Situatedness: 
In the early 2000's Ratcliffe introduced the outlines of what was to become his  model of
existential feelings, incorporating  elements of  Damasio’s background feeling.
“ According to Damasio, background feelings are ever-present, although ordinarily tacit. They
serve to structure the everyday ways in which we encounter the world, the basic ways in which we
find ourselves in the world:Ratcliffe 2002, p.298)
Damasio wrote:”. . . I am postulating another variety of feeling which I suspect preceded the others
in evolution. I call it background feeling because it originates in “background” body states 
rather than in emotional states. It is not the Verdi of grand emotion, nor the Stravinsky of 
intellectualized emotion but rather a minimalist in tone and beat, the feeling of life itself, 
the sense of being.” (1995, p. 150) 
 Ratcliffe fleshed out  his approach with elements drawn from  the phenomenologies of  Merleau-
Ponty, Husserl and Heidegger:
“Both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty add that localized experiences of possibility presuppose a
more-enveloping orientation, a sense of belonging to the world. When I see or think about
something, when I am afraid of something, and when I am in a bad mood about a wider situation,
I already find myself in the world, in a way than differs in kind from intentional experiences in
one or another modality (e.g. imagining, perceiving, or remembering something). This ‘world’ is
presupposed by intentional states of whatever kind with whatever content. We can think of it in
terms of a possibility space, a receptivity to types of possibility.”“Things are experienced as
significant to us, as mattering to us, in various different ways, something that involves a sense of
the possibilities they offer.” (Ratcliffe, 2020)
“...what Heidegger in Being and Time calls ‘Being-in-the-world’ is exactly what we gain
reflective access to by performing the phenomenological reduction...This conveys much the
same broad conception of ‘world’ that we find in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty:...something that
we are already practically, unreflectively immersed in when we experience something, think
about it or act upon it.”
These globally structured  patterns of existential feeling amount to “ ‘ways of finding
oneself in the world’. As such, they are what we might call ‘pre-intentional’, meaning that
they determine the kinds of intentional states we are capable of adopting, amounting to a
‘shape’ that all experience takes on.” (Ratcliffe 2015)  
The Affective ‘glue’ organizing existential feeling:
If for Ratcliffe, a global structure of feeling orients the significance for us of the objects and
persons we interact with in the world, how is this structure organized and sustained? What is the
‘glue’ that holds it together?
Ratcliffe’s  causal reinforcement-based model of affect assigns it the role of  biasing appraisal via
selectively guiding attention toward a heightening or lowering of perceived significance of
various world events. The role of affective attunement  is to produce  “changes in the  types of
significant possibility to which one is receptive’. (Ratcliffe 2016) “...existential feelings
determine the kinds of noetic and  noematic feelings that one is open to.  “...the  existential
feeling sets the parameters for the kinds of more localized experience one  is capable of
having.”(2016). “Emotions “tune us to the world, making it relevant to us by opening up certain
possibilities for explicit deliberation and closing off others. “(Ratcliffe 2002)
 Bodily  dispositions can actively direct one toward salient objects in one’s world, but are
“equally implicated in feeling unable to act upon something. Passivity in the  face of threat may
involve inclinations to withdraw, to retreat, along with the absence of any  other salient
possibilities.” (Ratcliffe 2015). For instance,  in depression  one cannot find the motivation to act
to change one’s situation ( a confident ‘I can’ becomes  ‘I can’t’).  Solipsistic self-perpetuating
narratives,  reinforced and organized by feelings of avoidance and reduced salience,  tell one why
they shouldn’t or can’t  connect with others.
“ In any experience, only certain  possibilities are offered up and only some of these appear
especially salient.  According to both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, the possibilities that show up
are  constituted by bodily dispositions. These dispositions shape all experience and show  
up as potentialities that belong to objects. The different ways in which the body responds to
things amount to different systems of concrete possibilities. “(Ratcliffe 2010)
In order to situate Ratcliffe’s orientation relative to the phenomenologists whose ideas he
incorporates, it is helpful to see how he makes use of   Damasio’s neuroscience-inspired
theorizing on the relations of affect and intention. 
“...emotions play a role in constraining and structuring the realm of explicit deliberation,
restricting deliberation to a small number of options and structuring patterns of reasoning, so that
we remain focused and relevant in our activities, able to act towards goals without becoming
distracted by trivia. Thus emotions and feelings serve to constrain and focus our attention, so that
we only consider from a pre-structured set of options. Damasio’s (1995, 1996) more specific
hypothesis is that emotions are cognitively mediated body states. He christens this theory the
“somatic marker hypothesis”. The idea is that somatic (body) signals are associated with
perceptual stimuli, either as a result of innate or learned neural connections, and thus “mark”
those stimuli. Different perceptions can be associated with various kinds of body states, which
may serve as alarm signals or, alternatively, as enticing invitations. According to Damasio, a
complex of such signals focuses and structures our cognitive interactions with the world. Once we
incorporate complex learned associations between perceptions and body states, a vast web of
somatic markers can develop. These signals serve to eliminate certain possibilities, which feel
bad, from a choice set and focus deliberation upon other feel good signals. Thus cognition is
constrained, enabled and structured by a background of emotion-perception correlations, that
manifest themselves as a changing background of implicit representations of body
states.”(Ratcliffe 2002)
Slaby provides this useful elaboration of how bodily feeling can be world-oriented:
 ” feeling bad emotionally (as opposed to  feeling bad due to physical illness or injury) is not a
disembodied, intellectual  appreciation of things going badly – although it surely is some kind of
appreciation of things going badly. It is also and essentially a bodily experience. If you are angry
and feel offended by your colleague, you have a self-disclosing bodily feeling. It is not easy to
describe it exactly, but I think you have the physical impression of being “pushed down”, of being
literally “oppressed” by an external force. In this way, emotional pain is essentially bodily. Its
bodily nature is not a separable “aspect” that is merely added on to an otherwise purely intellectual
appreciation of what’s going on; rather, it is the very core of the painful emotional experience.
“(Slaby 2008)
Let me encapsulate Ratcliffe’s perspective on the role of affect in determining the ways that  the
world can make sense to us. Ratcliffe says emotion and embodiment are “‘incorporated as
essential components in cognition”, but emotion and cognition are clearly not identical;
“...emotions and moods are not explicitly cognitive but neither are they independent of
cognition”(Ratcliffe 2002, p.299). They originate as bodily sensations structuring cognition from
outside of it. Emotion and cognition can 'conflict' and emotion can “override cognitive
judgement”(p.299). Ratcliffe cites Ramachandran’s clinical observations of individuals with
anosognosia, who apparently distort environmental information which contradicts an internally
generated narrative. Ramachandran and Ratcliffe attribute this behavior to damage to connections
between emotion and cognitive centers. Ratcliffe concludes from this that, in typically
functioning persons, emotion signals from the body are presumed to pack a contentful punch
large enough to break through a psychological narrative's resistances where weaker percepts from
the environment cannot.
It seems, then, that for Ratcliffe , intention is a capacity for manipulating objects of thought, but
emotion, as conditioning valuative valence,  provides the criteria for such processing. He is
apparently not able to find the resources strictly within what he thinks of as intentional thought to
de-center thinking processes, because he treats cognition as tending to form temporarily
self-perpetuating narratives which can distort or keep out contradictory input from the world. So
he relies on the body, in the form of emotion cues, to come to the rescue and bring the stalled
cognitive apparatus back in touch with a dynamically changing world. The mechanism of
emotion is assumed to intervene in order to infuse a stagnant narrative with a new direction and
meaning.
(FOOTNOTE: For Ratcliffe emotions selectively organize cognition not just by prompting the
interruption of a current narrative, but also by facilitating the assimilation of new events into an
ongoing context. Ratcliffe(2002) cites Ramachandran’s account of individuals with Capgras
syndrome as evidence that affect can serve to inform the cognitive system that a previously
experienced object is similar or identical to a current one.)
Ratcliffe(2002) asserts: “Without emotional responses, one is not uprooted from a coherent
interpretation of events...”(p.306). Although these emotion cues are claimed to be inseparably
linked with conceptual processes, this linkage amounts to more of a concatenation between
pre-existing states than a more radical indissociability. This may be due to the belief that feeling
originates developmentally within the individual independently from cognition, as action
readiness circuits that, Panksepp(1998) claims, are “completely biological and affective but...,
through innumerable sensory-perceptual interactions with our environments, [become]
inextricably mixed with learning and world events”(p.303)
For all their differences,  Ratcliffe shares with other contemporary accounts of affect and emotion
what I call the ‘adaptationist’ presumption that meaning is shaped in a semi-arbitrary way by
inputs which come to influence it from a pre-existing outside.  I don’t think Ratcliffe’s model of
affectivity  has abandoned the naturalist pre-suppositions animating Damasio’s (2000) claim:
“...as a result of powerful learning mechanisms such as conditioning, emotions of all shades
eventually help connect homeostatic regulation and survival values to numerous events and
objects in our autobiographical experience”(p.54). According to this thinking, physiological
processes of feeling adapt and co-ordinate with a partially independent cogitative environment,
authorizing adaptationism as a causal explanation of origins.
Viewed as an adaptation, emotion is linked to a milieu outside of itself (cognition) and with
which the logic of the bond is indirect, partially arbitrary in the sense that it is capable of being
made irrational, as is supposedly the case with nonadaptive mutations. There is a partial
independence assumed between the participant aspects of reciprocally adaptive interactions. The
cobbling can be uncobbled unilaterally. Emotion can aid reason, but can also be dysfunctional.
Husserl’s Transcendental Affect
Ratcliffe insists that affectivity and intentionality are inseparable, And yet, it is significant that he
still finds it coherent to imagine what a situation might be like in which affect was absent from
our experience of the world. 
“...affect binds us to things, making them relevant and ‘lighting up’ aspects of the world in such
a way as to call forth actions and thoughts. Without the world-structuring orientation that they
provide, we are disoriented, cut off from the world, which no longer solicits thoughts and
actions and is consequently devoid of value. In effect, [William] James is saying that our very
sense of reality is constituted by world-orienting feelings that bind us to things .” (Ratcliffe
2005)
“ The absence of emotion comprises a state of cognitive and behavioural paralysis rather than
fully functional cognition, stripped of ‘mere’ affect. A phenomenology without affect is a
phenomenology that guts the world of all its significance. The experienced world is ordinarily
enriched by the feelings that we sew into it, that imbue it with value and light it up as an arena
of 
cognitive and behavioural possibilities. So cognition without affect is not, according to James,
in any sense complete. It is an extreme phenomenological privation that strips the world of all
meaning, a state of depression or ‘melancholia’. In such a state, James describes how ‘the world
now looks remote, strange, sinister, uncanny. Its color is gone, its breath is cold, there is no
speculation in the eyes it glares with’” (James 1902: p. 151), (Ratcliffe 2005).
Slaby concurs: “Nothing but  “neutral states of intellectual perception” would remain, as William
James famously put it, when we “try to abstract from consciousness [of an emotion] all the
feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms” (James 1884, 193).” “Not all human experience is
clearly marked as hedonic, and so not all human experience is affective. “(Slaby 2008)
In sum, the experienced world without affect is an ‘extreme privation’, a world of paralysis,
meaninglessness, disorientation. Even if  Ratcliffe conjures the idea of affectless cognition  only
as a purely hypothetical thought experiment or limit case, the  fact that he can associate any
qualities at all with such a world indicates that he is operating from a concept of affect that does
not treat it as  a philosophical a priori.   But what would such a philosophically grounding
approach to affect look like?  Imagine that instead of hypothesizing awareness without affect, we
were to place time out of bounds. It is immediately clear that any attempt to describe the
qualitative features of one’s experience of such a world (meaningless, paralyzed, disoriented, etc)
would be pointless, since without time there could be no awareness and no world. If we were to
re-construe affect in such a way that it became as irreducible to experience as time, then it would
no longer be a matter of deriving feeling, mood, emotion and other forms of affectivity from 
adaptive patterns of contingent interactive bodily  and interpersonal schemes, but of locating their
origin in the basis of being itself. This is what Husserl attempted with his model of temporal
constitution.
Husserl’s grounding of affectivity in temporality is a transcendental grounding, not a naturalistic
one. Underlying and founding all strata of bodily and interpersonal dynamics  is  the assimilative
basis of temporal constitution as retention, primal impression and protention. This is Husserl’s
primordial pre-condition for any world , any being.
The subjective and objective sides of the structure of temporal synthesis are not separate entities
but only poles of a single act of intentional sense.  In this synthesis, both the subject and the
object pole contribute their own quality of feeling to what  ‘an object is for the subject’ in its
valuative , affective sense. The energetic dynamism of feeling isn’t something added to a content
of perception from outside of it, in causal relation with it as agent of reinforcement. Meaning
content implies its own affective force, the affective signature is intrinsic to the objective and
subjective sides. This is what constitutes the ‘life’ in what Husserl calls the living present. The
affective qualities contributed by the objective pole (noema) are its vivacity. Husserl describes the
affective allure contributed by the objective pole as  “that varying vivacity of a lived experience, of a
datum of consciousness.”(Passive and Active Synthesis, p.214)
And an affective signature is intrinsic to the subject, in the form of desires, tendencies, strivings,
anticipations, aimed at the objective pole.  As Husserl says, there are rays emanating from
subjective side  to the objective side and vice-versa. Both affects originating on the subjective
side and those originating on the objective side are implied in all intentional meaning. The
always present  affective qualities of the object (beautiful, pleasurable, unpleasant) are not made
thematic in objectivating acts (perceiving a spatial object), but they are in valuative acts.   And
one’s affective,  hedonic attitude toward the object of an intention (disappointed, depressed,
elated, bored, frightened)  may not be thematized in theoretical interest, but will appear in our
practical attitude toward the world.   
Husserl’s starting point in the retention-impression-protention triad of time consciousness is
already a self-othering, thus  an exposure to the foreign from within the resources of subjectivity, 
prior to any configurational-corporeal constitution. Natural bodily structures are not the basis of
affect for Husserl. If one wants to still talk about a body, what remains of the body for Husserl
once one has dug beneath all the sedimented layers of constituted meaning, would be the ‘body’
of  the retention-impression-protention triad of time consciousness. This is   already a self-
othering, thus  an exposure to the foreign from within the resources of subjectivity,  prior to any
configurational-corporeal constitution, prior to any empirically defined physiological or
psychological structures, prior to human beings,  but presupposed by them. Affect is not an
evolutionary device, it is synonymous with entity, being, existence, object, subject. Being as the
moment of experience is simultaneously the feeling of being affected and the feeling of
anticipatory striving. These precede the notion of a body as biological organism, and instead is a
pre-condition for being of any sort. Feeling, understood most primordially,  is simply movement
(not in empirical but subjective space), transition, becoming, time. 
Footnote: Maxine Sheets-Johnstone’s (2011)  grounding of affectivity in activity recalls Husserl,
but her rendering of it in terms of spatio-temporal  movement and kinesthesia remains at the level
of empirical space and time and fails to ground feeling relative to  more  primordial notions of
internal temporality and spatiality common to Husserl, Gendlin, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger.
Husserl introduces a   a primordial motivational principle in which noetic anticipatory
assimilation  dominates the  foreignness of the noematic object pole.  This means that the
capacity of experiences  to delight or disturb us, particularly  when it comes to profoundly self-
affecting valuative concerns, is much more a function of the relation of the event to our strivings
and anticipations than it is to whatever qualitites of feeling (enticement, allure, vivacity) are
contributed by the object pole in itself. 
If we were simply to conclude that an anticipatory tendency, a general striving toward
‘possibilities’ of fulfillment,  characterizes at all levels Husserl’s project, then we could
justifiably claim that he has this in common with Ratcliffe, whose approach also is oriented
around anticipatory temporality and possibilities. But it is not simply that Husserl claims
protention as a general going beyond itself of one’s experience of an object, rather that this going
beyond itself has the character of a peculiar implicative consistency.
We strive to assimilate experiences.  We see the centrality of similarity manifest itself at all
levels of constitution, in the subjective achievement of  synthetic unities, analogical apperceptive
pairing,  associative relationality, correlations, harmonious fulfillments, subjective ‘mineness’,
variations, flowing multiplicities,  congruities, nexuses, coherences, etc.   Even in difference,
negation, senselessness, irrationality, alienation  there is no experience in consciousness that is
not in an overarching way variation on a  thematics (which are already associative syntheses of
variations on variations) for Husserl , a similarity-in-difference.
Protention and retention are included in what Husserl calls a “universal drive intentionality
(Treibintentionalität).” Experience is being affected and  changed by what one anticipatorily aims
at through striving. As Bernet says “ this originary process, as a life-process, is not simply an
automatic process; it has a goal and the tendency to draw near to this goal.”( Bernet 2010, p.16). 
Striving as desire “is striving after, or driving away from, shunning, that is, it has its positivity
and negativity.”“Its fulfillment is a relaxation  that results from realizing [the striving, etc.], in
the change into the corresponding joy of fulfillment.” On the other hand, because “expectations
can really only be fulfilled through perceptions, they are also essentially susceptible to
disappointment in all circumstances.”  “...something new can be a slap in the face to all
expectation.” (Husserl 1989)
How does this anticipatory receptivity on the part of the subjective, or  Ego pole of experience
compare with Ratcliffe’s claim that bodily felt dispositions constrain and orient our receptivity to
the world? 
  Ratcliffe explains:
 “I have argued  – drawing on the work of Husserl (1989), amongst others – that experience of
worldly  possibilities is inextricable from a sense of bodily dispositions... loss of enticing
possibilities from the world is bound up  with a lethargic body that is not stirred into action by its
surroundings. Again and  again, first-person reports by psychiatric patients convey pervasive
experiential changes, where an alteration in how the body feels is at the same time a shift in how 
the world appears and in how one relates to it. “
The dependence of our perceptions on bodily dispositions that Ratcliffe credits Husserl for
revealing to us is a correlation  that appears when we are approaching the world within the
natural attitude. It represents that stratum of constitution within which the world opens up for us
in terms of physical objects, subjective sensations,  and  casual relations between the psychical
and the physical. Included within this naturalistic stratum of thinking are  psychophysical
relations intertwining  my feeling sensate body with my felt physical body.  Ratcliffe’s account of
bodily felt dispositions as a complex of learned associations between perceptions and body states
belongs to this natural causal stratum.  However, Husserl asserts that making sense of
intersubjective experiences such as  affect, feeling, valuation, emotion and mood requires a shift
from  the natural attitude to what he calls the personal or spiritual attitude. Within this higher
stratum,  natural causation is replaced by intentional motivation.  
“...when we speak of the spiritual or personal Ego, that is to be understood as the subject of
intentionality, and we see that motivation is the lawfulness of the life of the spirit.”“ The" because-
so" of motivation has a totally different sense than causality in the sense of nature.”(Ideas II, p. 231)
My bodily felt dispositions lose their character as causal conditionings when I relate to the world  
as a  valuing,  intending social participant, and instead are fused with and  subordinated to  the
motivated valuative intentionalities driven by the dynamics of my social interactions. Only when
I shift back to the natural attitude do mood dispositions appear for me again  in terms of causal
bodily feelings and sensations  (lethargic, constricted, closed off, energized, aroused, etc). But
noticing ‘how my body feels’ only contributes to the elucidation of intentional moods when
transferred from the naturalistic to the personalistic sphere as a metaphor. For example,  my
personalistic sense of my depression infuses and animates my feeling of bodily lethargy with the
corresponding  affective intentional meaning of feeling ‘down in the dumps’. Without this 
interpretive animation coming from the higher intentional stratum, fusing with and  lending
metaphorical significance to the bodily data, my corporeal sensations of lethargy would bear no
direct relevance to my being in the world as depressed.  No pattern of organization of causally
intertwined perception and corporeal feeling would ever be able turn bodily sensations like
generic lethargy into  intentionally significant  moods, values or emotions.  
“To be sure, I find the stratum of sensation to be localized in the Body, including therefore
physical pleasure and physical pain; but that only shows that this stratum does not belong to the
realm of what properly pertains to the Ego.” (Husserl, Ideas II p.223)
“...in my theoretical, emotional, and practical behavior-in my theoretical experience and thinking,
in my position-taking as to pleasure, enjoyment, hoping, wishing, desiring, wanting-l feel myself
conditioned by the matter in question, though this obviously does not mean psychophysically
conditioned... For this realizing apprehension, the psychophysical relations do not play,
obviously, any actual essential role. I  apprehend myself as dependent in my behavior, in my acts,
on the things themselves, on their beautiful color, on their special form, on their pleasant
or dangerous properties. I do not therein apprehend myself as dependent on my Body or on my
history.” (Ideas II p.148)
Husserl allows that an intention  can address and modify a more or less global background of
pragmatic valuative concerns, or else be confined to only one detail of experience. A perceptual
object can appear in its normal shape and color, but feel unreal or unenticing when we are
depressed.  The affective and valuative aspects most narrowly associated with a perception do
not reflect one’s depressed state because they are not directly implicated in the global changes in
ones comportment toward the world ,whereas higher strata of   valuative feelings related to ones
interpersonal engagements and expectations are directly affected. The key point is that the 
integrated structure of experience is such for Husserl that both higher and lower strata of
valuative intentional constitution are engaged in such globally self-implicating experiences as
depression and grief. Mood and emotion do not shape or condition as causal reinforcements, but
instead express the relative anticipatory integrity of  motivated position takings,  drawing  on a
habitual history of valuative position-takings.
The constitution of intentional sense pertaining to one aspect of one’s life does not occur in
isolation from all other aspects of one’s mental processes. For Husserl, the anticipatory nature of
intentionality provides mental processes with a hierarchicizing organizational tendency. As
Husserl puts it, a part demands a whole. And larger wholes demand even larger wholes within
which to associate themselves in intentional syntheses. Relatively trivial perceptual meanings are
motivated and framed in relation to more subordinate concerns and these are motivationally
oriented in relation to ones most important self-involving goals .  Experiences such as severe
depression have their encompassing effects by virtue of the interlocking organization of meaning
implications. Depression is a sweeping disappointment and loss at the highest, most integrative
level of anticipative self-regard  in relation to the interpersonal world. 
The fact that Husserl’s starting point is transcendental  does not mean that a naturalized account
of affect like that of Ratcliffe could not complement Husserl’s a priori one.  I don’t mean to enter
into a debate concerning whether insights of phenomenological philosophies of authors such as
Husserl and Heidegger can be naturalized. There is no one notion of the natural. The history of
empiricism is a genealogy of changing philosophies of the empirical and the natural. Eugene
Gendlin’s process model is an example of a naturalistic approach which accords in many ways
with Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger. My interest in this paper is to persuade that 
Ratcliffe’s particular naturalized interpretation of Merleau-Ponty, Husserl and Heidegger   lacks  
a core concept defining  the latter’s approaches, the fusion of affectivity, conation and
temporality. The organization principle underlying Ratcliffe’s natural model implies a different
philosophical ground than that of Husserl’s, one more aligned with pragmatism and hermeneutics
( and the phenomenologies of Sartre, Scheler and Stein) than Husserl, Merleau-Ponty  Heidegger
or Gendlin.
Husserl offers a model of recursivity uniting self-referential continuity and absolute alterity, the
subjective and the objective, the affective and the conative, in the same intentional moment.
Husserl’s general notion of affect, applying to such terms as emotion, feeling and desire as well,
determines that every experienced event of any kind (bodily-sensory, perceptual, conceptual,
practical-valuative ) is an affect, and every affect is a change in affect. If every event of meaning
is an advent of qualitative novelty, then cognition is affective not simply in the sense that a
background affective tonality, mood or attunement frames the activity as a whole, as “a kind of
cradle within which cognition rests”(Ratcliffe,2002,p.296), but in that each moment of
engagement is an inseparable inter-bleeding between  a prior context of attunement or thematics,
and a change in that attunement.
Heidegger on Attunement and Understanding;
In Heidegger’s Befindlichkeit, which has been variously and imperfectly translated as
attunement, mood, self-finding and state of mind, we find the most thoroughgoing
phenomenological articulation of the inseparable relation of  affect, intention and temporality.
Temporality is the well-spring out of which Dasein as Being in the world emerges. Temporality, 
the way the world discloses itself to Dasein, is structured as  the equi-primordial gestures of care,
understanding, attunement and discourse. 
 
Since his earliest  writings on background dispositions of  feeling, Ratcliffe has used 
Heidegger’s Befindichkiet as a source of inspiration. But Heidegger follows Husserl in grounding
the orienting capacity of affective attunement in a radical notion of temporality rather than in a
schematic causal interaction between body states and meaning intentions.      
Ratcliffe writes; 
“...a mood is not an intentional state but a condition of possibility for intentionality .” “According
to Heidegger, moods are not intentional states that encompass a wide range of objects. Rather, they
are modes of Befindlichkeit, ways of finding oneself in the world. This, he says, is presupposed by
the intelligibility of intentionally directed experiences, thoughts and activities: „: “The mood has
already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to
direct oneself  towards something” (Heidegger, 1962, p.176/ 137). A central characteristic of
Befindlichkeit, in its various modes, is that it determines the ways in which things can matter to us
and, therefore, the kinds of intentional state we can adopt.”
(Ratcliffe 2012)
There is a  crucial difference between Ratcliffe’s understanding of intention as directedness
toward an object and what Heidegger means when he talks about directing oneself toward
something. For Heidegger, ‘directedness toward’ does not mean  connecting with a pre-existing
object in a propositional stance but constituting an ‘object’ from the synthesis  of past , present
and future as a projective forehaving.
This projective disclosing  does not mean, as Ratcliffe seems to think, an anticipation of possible
happenings in the future. Ratcliffe says Heideggerian Care is ”the way that we are anchored in
the past (facticity), situated in the present (fallenness) and forever looking to the future
(projection)” (Ratcliffe 2002)).  But the past, present and future don’t operate for Heidegger as
distinct modes. They interpenetrate each other so completely that all three are inseparably
implicated in  facticity,  fallenness and projection. As Gendlin(1997b) explains, “the past
functions to "interpret" the present,...the past is changed by so functioning. This needs to be put
even more strongly: The past functions not as itself, but as already changed by what it functions
in”(p.37 ). What the past functions in comes toward Dasein from the future. Dasein "occurs out
of its future"."Da-sein, as existing, always already comes toward itself, that is, is futural in its
being in general." "Only because Da-sein in general IS as I AM-having-been, can it come
futurally toward itself in such a way that it comes-back." Thus, "Having been arises from the
future".(Being and Time, p.299)
Contra Ratcliffe, Heidegger differentiates his use of the word ‘possibility’ from a conventional
(and Husserl’s),  understanding of it :
 “The being-possible, which Da-sein always is existentially, is ... distinguished from empty,
logical possibility and from the contingency of  something objectively present, where this or that
can "happen" to it. As a  modal category of objective presence, possibility means what is not yet
real  and not always necessary. It characterizes what is only possible. Ontologically, it is less
than reality and necessity. “(Being and Time p.135)
 “Every understanding has its mood. Every attunement understands. “ “...what is encountered in
the world is always already in a relevance which is disclosed in the understanding of world.”
“‘As this understanding, it "knows" what is going on, that is, what its potentiality of being is.
Da-sein is not something objectively present which then has as an addition the ability to do
something, but is rather primarily being-possible. Da-sein is always what it can be and how it is
its possibility.”(p.134)
The attuned understanding projecting itself  upon possibilities is not a future possibility as a
hypothetical present that has not happened yet.  A possibility is a relevant   field of meaning
happening now as implicit, veiled, undifferentiated meaning . It is the present in the mode of
undifferentiated,  implicit , but  actually existing possibilities that the past has projected itself
into NOW. Explicit relations with equipment and other Da-seins emerge out of the implicit,
veiled, undifferentiated field of relevance which Heidegger  calls a possibility.
“...what is encountered in the world is always already  in a relevance which is disclosed in the
understanding of world, a relevance which is made explicit by interpretation.” “When  something
is understood but still veiled, it becomes unveiled by an act of  appropriation...”
“the world which has already been understood is  interpreted. What is at hand comes explicitly
before sight that understands. “(Heidegger 2010)
Footnote: Slaby  refers to his model of affect as ‘radical situatedness’ and yet shares  Ratcliffe’s
traditional, inauthentic understanding of  affective temporality as  causal dispositional state
taking place in time, which is to say that, contrary to Heideggerian temporality, for Slaby time is
divided into  separate phases: the present as what is happening now, the future as what is  not yet
now, and the past as what is no longer now. 
Slaby says factual situatedness “is situatedness in a place and a time, synchronic and diachronic”.
“Affectivity ultimately is time,  namely the factual past in the form of sedimented remainders
that infuse,  burden, and potentially suffocate ongoing comportment.”
“ The existential task of affective disclosure is circumscribed by this essential tension: A tension
between  what is already apprehended, articulated, and made sense of, and what is  furthermore
“out there,” beyond us, yet weighing on us and determining our  situation in unforeseeable
ways.” (Slaby 2017).
This is an important point, because Heideggerian projection conveys the idea that the structure of 
temporality marks each present experience, each ‘NOW’,  as a global shift of existential feeling.
“Attunement is grounded in thrownness”,... and, as thrown, Da-sein is thrown into the mode of
being of projecting.” This means that each moment is a change in one’s way of being in the
world.  Even as moods maintain a loose  ongoing thematic consistency over time, nevertheless
each interpretive moment of attuned understanding unravels and subtly but globally ’reframes the
frame’. 
Affectivity is not an existential  state (there are no actual states, frames, representations, schemas,
dispositions of existence for Heidegger, neither attuned nor intentional), not  a background
orientation of mood that frames particular intentions and emotions as a whole, as “a kind of
cradle within which cognition rests”(Ratcliffe,2002,p.296) but simultaneously a change in
affectivity, sense and understanding which for Heidegger  is nothing other than the experienced
equi-primordiality of the ecstasies of past present and future as the becoming of the NOW. 
 Attunement is disclosive,  not as a pre-deliberative, pre-reflective evaluative  backdrop to
intentional deliberation, a pre-given disposition as an already existing frame which shapes not yet
actual possibilities.  It is self-changing projective being-assailed by the  world , always in a new
way, every new moment,  whose ongoing anticipatory continuity as ‘this particular mood’ is at
the same time a moment-to-moment self-reinvention born of thrownness.   Being-affected always
totals, addresses and modifies  all of ones prior experience.  For both Heidegger and
Gendlin(whose work will be addressed  later in this paper), the totality of one’s past pragmatic-
valuative-affective comportment toward the world  functions and changes  as a single unity, with
all of its ‘parts’ always implying each other. One’s comportment in fact only exists through its
being changed moment to moment as  attunement-intention. 
When Heidegger says that, in attunement, Dasein “is disclosed to itself before all cognition and
willing and beyond their scope of disclosure” this is not a validation of  Ratcliffe’s claim that
propositional intentionality is an activity oriented within and framed by mood. The distinction
Ratcliffe makes between existential and intentional structures of experience does not exist for
Heidegger. While  attunement,  as an ontological concept,  is a more primordial notion than will
or cognition, it is not as if the latter simply act as variable moves within a more or less stable
orienting background situatedness .On the contrary, such ontic concepts as cognition, willing,
intending are inauthentic modes of ‘letting things be encountered’, and letting things be
encountered   IS being affected or moved by them freshly moment to moment. In other words,
each intention as it appears subtly reinvents the attunement that  it occurs into. 
Against Heidegger’s explicit determination of attunement as equi-primordial with discourse and
understanding , meaning that none of these modes has priority over the others in a valuative,
genetic or ontological sense, Ratcliffe wants to prioritize  attunement. 
“..it is mood that has primacy over understanding, as mood is responsible for determining the
kinds of possibility that are presupposed by understanding. What Heidegger calls “discourse ”
(Rede ) similarly depends upon mood .” (Ratcliffe 2012)
We can see why it may be important for Ratcliffe  to give mood a formative role that is not
accorded to understanding or discourse,  based on what has been presented so far concerning his
distinction between existential feeling and intentionality,  Briefly stated, Ratcliffe reads
Heidegger’s account of attunement as akin to the role of existential feeling, a, global interactive
scheme composed of reciprocally causal innate and learned associations between perceptions and
body states. Understanding, as propositional intentionality, is a particular relational structure
within that orienting disposition. “...cognition is constrained, enabled and structured by a
background of emotion-perception correlations, that manifest themselves as a changing
background of implicit representations of body states.”(Ratcliffe 2002).  Heidegger, in contrast, 
explicitly warns against interpreting Understanding as the thematic propositional grasping of
intentional meaning, insisting that such a misreading  “degrades it to the level of a given,
intended content.”(Being and Time, p.145)
Intentionally directed experiences don’t simply occur within the larger framework of a specific
attunement. As factical experiences of interpretation,  they are themselves changes in our global
attunement. The mode of interpretation, which is where one can locate activities of perception,
intention and interpersonal interaction in general, is not  a modality conforming to a specific
theme of significance of a prior  attunement. As a development of understanding, it is a particular
way  of changing ones attunement as a whole.  Thus, if  attuned understanding determines the
kinds of intentional meanings we are capable of adopting, then intentional meanings as they arise
in circumspective relevance out of previous ones reshape  the kinds of attuned understanding  we
are capable of having. 
On the one hand, variation in modes of attunement is as continuous as time itself. On the other
hand, a  thematic continuity holds for Dasein throughout its moment to moment global shifts in
sense and feeling such that relatively stable ongoing modes of comportment toward the world are
discernable.
Ratcliffe believes he can prioritize  attunement over understanding because, as we have seen, his
schematic feeling  model begins from a split between the subjective (body feeling state) and
objective (perceptual and propositional intentional meaning) poles of experience. As a result of
this split, the affective and perceptual-connative components are treated as if they are separate
aspects in states of variable relationality.  When bodily feeling states function to enhance our 
engagement with the world, according to Ratcliffe, we experience ourselves more intimately
situated in the world. On the other hand, affective relevance (“the sense of being situated in a
world” (Existential Feeling 2017) can be profoundly diminished, leaving propositional
intentionality intact but devoid of adaptive orientation. One is still aware of a world moment to
moment, one still has perceptions and memories, and yet this world is denuded of felt relevance
and we are inclined to avoid social interaction. For instance, Ratcliffe claims that  anxiety is
intrinsically ‘alienating’ or ‘externalising’. It can alienate us from its objects (Ratcliffe and
Wilkinson 2016).  Ratcliffe considers the most extreme cases of erosion of situatedness , of the 
ability and capacity to experience types of possibility and to contemplate certain relevant options,
to be a form of decision-making impairment and incompetence (Ratcliffe, forthcoming). 
Fernandenz, along with Ratcliffe,  believes that psycho-pathologies like depression involve “a
general degradation in our ability to be affectively situated in and attuned to our world” and
perhaps even the complete loss of affective situatedness. 
“... the degree to which one is attuned to and situated in a  world through moods can itself
undergo change. .. Some cases of people diagnosed with depression are best understood not  as
an erosion of a particular mood, or as the emergence of a new mood, but instead as an erosion  of
the category of moods as a whole; that is to say, as an erosion of the structure of situatedness. ”
 “Alfred Kraus also characterizes melancholic depression as a loss of moods and feelings: "At its
core, the melancholic mood alteration is-paradoxically formulated-rather a lack of mood" (Kraus
2003, 208, Fernandez 2014).”
Ratcliffe’s understanding of situatedness differs from Heidegger’s in a number of crucial ways.
First, unlike Heidegger’s account, Ratciffe’s Befindlichkiet is not an irreducible apriori of
affective experience, but instead is the contingent product of a complex configuration of bodily
and perceptual elements. Affective attunement for him is the achievement of a concatenating 
process. When we delve beneath Ratcliffe’s global schemes to locate the invariant and essential
condition of possibility of his feeling-perceptual concatenations, we arrive at a reciprocally
casual model of co-determinative interactive bits. But having arrived  at this  neo-Kantian
‘apriori’, we are not yet in the vicinity of Heidegger’s Befindhlichkeit..  Befindlichkeit  is not the
product of an orienting device, adaptation  or conditioning scheme, and not the  ground of any
reciprocally causal schematic structure, except as that structure be understood as a derived 
abstraction concealing its own basis in temporality.  
In order to understand primordial situatedness, we have to bracket Ratcliffe’s causal naturalist
model in its entirety, and think prior to the split between feeling and thinking that it presupposes
What is essential and invariant in the Heideggerian structure of situatedness as temporality is that
each moment is the disclosure of the now as affectingly foreign-familiar. For Heidegger not only
is there no self and no world prior to relationship, but the self is nothing BUT this between.
Being situated in a world is not a contingent accomplishment of a scheme of reinforcements, but
a presupposition of Being. Dasein is always fundamentally affectively situated in that it is thrown
into its NOW as surprised familiarity.  This means that attunement is not a relationship between
self and world that can be broken or diminished,  as Ratcliffe asserts, regardless of what mood
one is in. The most intractably severe depression is still, moment to moment, an awareness of
being thrown into continual affective transformation and transition, as long as it is an awareness
of anything at all.  And as self-transforming, the affective basis of ongoing experience is always
at the same time a projecting fore-having that anticipates into what surprises or disappoints or
depresses it.  The world of the depressive that  appears unreal, insignificant, irrelevant, un-
engaging,  is meaningful precisely in its  unreality and deficiency as disorienting, confusing,
strange, uncanny, un-engageable, numbing.  Experience of ongoing deprivation, lack and loss is
not the degeneration  of the structure of situatedness as projective-thrownness, but situatedness as
always a new but at the same time  anticipated sense of loss and absence.
      
 Heidegger offers:
 “Dasein in itself is essentially Being-with” “Being-with existentially determines Da-sein even
when an other is not factically present and perceived. The being-alone of Da-sein, too, is
being-with in the world. The other can be lacking only in and for a being-with. Being-alone is a
deficient mode of being-with, its possibility is a proof for the latter.” When one feels alone in a
crowd, “Their Mitda-sein is encountered in the mode of indifference and being alien. Lacking and
"being away" are modes of Mitda-sein...[Being-with-others]”. (Being and Time, p.113)
I want to make clear that the essential issue between Heidegger and Ratcliffe I am attempting to
articulate does not rest on whether we deem the nightmarish existential experience of severe
depression, as well as other alterations of affective significance, in qualitative vs quantitative
terms.  After all, Heidegger uses a variety of adjectives (distorted, flattened, blind to itself,  led
astray,  confused, closed off, obscuring, forgetful, deficient)  to describe inauthentic modes of
Dasein,  and their associated moods, which can just as well be interpreted in terms of a lessening
of the fluidity of existential movement as they can via a positive qualitative shift in modality of
comportment. 
 The key point here is that however we prefer to characterize the organizational characteristics of 
mood marking the  devastation of depression and other pathologies of world significance, we
must understand such variation as taking place within the structure of a primordial situatedness
whose essential features are invariant throughout such vicissitudes of mood. Specifically, what
remains essential regardless of the severity of states of trauma.   melancholia or
depersonalization, is the underlying temporal-affective-conative ’glue’ of Befindlichkeit.  To be
radically, irreducibly , primordially  situated in a world is to be guaranteed , at every moment,  a
world that feelingly, creatively impinges on me anew as foreign. And it is simultaneously, to feel
a belonging (familiarity) to what impinges on me in its foreignness due to the anticipative,
projective futural aspect  of temporality.  In this way, affectivity as temporality  constitutes the
essence of the fundamental, irreducibly situated felt significance and relevance a world always
already has for me, a meaningfulness within whose bounds pathological conditions such as
depression appear as modifications, but whose basis  they can never undermine.(Heidegger
would say that their possibility as deficiencies or privations is proof for the essentiality of
Befindlichkeit.).
 Such experiences are predicaments within affective situatedness rather than crises of
situatedness. The supposed crisis of situatedness which leads to what Ratcliffe calls an
impairment and even incompetence in capacity to experience significant meaningfulness
(Ratcliffe,  forthcoming)  only appears as a possibility when one begins from  a split between
affect and intention. When one instead begins from the  fusion of self and world that radical
temporality instantiates, there can be only existential predicaments, not disorders of situatedness. 
Since  I am always already relevantly involved in a world  via thrownness,  depression has to do
with  the kind of relevance I experience, not my capacity or competence to experience it . And
contra Ratcliffe, anxiety doesn’t ‘cause’ alienation, it is the attempt to mitigate the loss of
coherence that alienating, threatening events portend. Heidegger says anxiety is a form of fear, 
and “fear is a fear of something threatening-of something that is detrimental to the factical
potentiality-of-being of Da-sein” “What is encountered has the relevant nature of harmfulness.”
(Being and Time p.313). Thus it is the situation, not the emotion, that is alienating, and anxious 
attunement  is the  anticipation of, and incipient comportment away from,  an impeding event
that holds within itself the specter of the alien, the unassimilable and thus the unanticipatable. 
In order for Ratcliffe to be convinced that attunement and understanding are truly equi-
primordial, he would have to find a way to relate the affective and cognitive aspects of
experience more intricately than he has been able to. For Heidegger, mood and understanding are
equi-primordial because the objective and subjective poles of experience are inseparable in each
moment of experience. That is to say, Heideigger’s notion of temporality makes  movement,
becoming, transition, the in-between,  prior to any beings, bodies, states, entities, schemes that
supposedly exist for a moment as in-themselves entities and then undergo change.  The in-
between IS affect and feeling itself, as well as sense, as the being affected by what one
projectively discloses ahead of oneself (reminiscent of Husserl’s inseparable objective-subjective
contributions to feeling). For Heidegger, affect, emotion and feeling are not bodily structures
reporting, interpreting or reacting to change, they are change itself as the structure of temporality. 
Heidegger captures this in-between with his notion of authentic anxiety, the essence of being
changed by what is disclosed , abstracted from all contingent features of world context. Authentic
anxiety , not as selective scheme of bodily reinforcement, but as temporality in its essence,
underlies all and is implied by all particular moods, since every moment of time is both of
familiarity (forehaving) and surprise (thrownness), relation and foreignness. 
 "Uncanniness is the fundamental kind of being-in-the-world, although it is covered over in
everydayness. Tranquillized, familiar being-in-the-world is a mode of the uncanniness of Dasein,
not the other way around. Not-being-at-home must be conceived existentially and ontologically as
the more primordial phenomenon." "The publicness of the they suppresses everything unfamiliar"
"Even as covered over, the familiar is a mode of the unfamiliar."(Heidegger 2010)
The inseparable co-dependence of the foreign and the familiar (the essence of affectivity as well
as sense) is implicit in the radical temporal understanding common to the phenomenologies of
Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and Gendlin.
With his concept of primordial anxiety, Heidegger’s intention  is not to give preference to
alienation and disconnection over relational integrity. He is re-situating the  identity-difference ,
same -other, subject -object, affect-conative binary (which appears for Ratciffe in the guise of
reciprocal objective causality) in a more primordial way. The fact that the  foreign-familiar binary
of primordial anxiety underlies all particular attunements of situatedness doesn’t deprive
Heidegger’s model of the relative ongoing meaningful stability over time that is rendered in
Ratcliffe’s perspective. Rather, it grounds Ratcliffe’s structures within a more intricate dynamic.
Even the most confident, effectively anticipatory and harmonious schematic comportment toward
the world pre-supposes Heideggerian ‘anxiety’, the projective-surprised being-affected by the
world in general, in each moment of its instantiation.
The paradox of Heidegger’s radically temporal thinking is that it enacts  a carrying-forward which
re-invents its direction, sense and past every moment, beyond conscious control, without rending
the intimate fabric of its anticipative continuity. Heideggerian attunement exposes a relentless
global self and world-transformational mobility within every moment of, but invisible to,  
Ratcliffe’s supposed schematic existential states, and   at the same time imparts to our ongoing
world situatedness an irreducible integrity and intimacy which no pathology can undermine.
Gendlin’s Model of Temporality and Implicit Intricacy:
My attempt at a direct comparison between Ratcliffe’s  naturalized,  embodied approach and
Heidegger’s ontological project has been somewhat hampered by the fact that Heidegger made
little reference in his work to the status and role of the body in relation to situatedness and
affectivity. It may be helpful , then , to turn to Eugene Gendlin’s process model. Like Ratcliffe’s
existential feeling, Gendlin’s approach offers  a naturalized account of embodied affect. But
Gendlin rejects Ratcliffe’s causal conditioning model,  and its reliance on  conventional notions of
time, in favor of a reading of  Heideggerian temporality consonant with the one I have been
advancing in this paper.  In various writings, he distinguishes his Heideggerian account of
affective situatedness from phenomenologically-influenced causal interactionist readings such as
those of  Gallagher , Varela, Fuchs and Sheets-Johnstone (See Gendlin 2008, 2012). 
 Gendlin’s approach has elements that seem to fall within  the causal adaptationist orbit
characterizing  Ratcliffe’s approach.  Like Ratcliffe, Gendlin sees emotion as an evolutionary
adaptation that specifically organizes behavior by selectively altering attention.  But Gendlin
differentiates emotion form bodily feeling, what he calls felt sensing. 
Here we have an articulation of bodily feeling as an organized totality  whose motivational
principle is not that of an interactional casusality between feeling and knowing states, but an
implicitly feeling-knowing sense.
Gendlin’s account superficially resembles Ratcliffe’s embodied cognitive approach in its rejection
of symbolic representationalism and decoupleability, but  there are crucial differences. In
Ratcliffe’s model,  interaction spreads in a reciprocally causal fashion from point to point,
whereas for Gendlin, each point somehow implies each other point; each part of a meaning
organization somehow “knows about”, belongs to and depends intrinsically on each other part.
And this happens before a part can simply be said to exist in itself(even if just for an instant).
What kind of odd understanding concerning the interface between identity and relation could
justify Gendlin's insistence that the inter-affection between parts of a psychological organization
precedes the existence of individual entities? 
As Gendlin(1997b) argues, 
‘The continuity of time cannot first be made by things next to each other, because such a
continuity is passive; each bit IS alone, and must depend on some other continuity to relate it to
what is next to it...”(p.71). For instance, fresh intentional experience does not simply sit
alongside a prior context; it explicates the immediate past [Gendlin characterizes this past as an
implicatory whole].
“In the old model something (say a particle or a body) exists, defined as filling space and time.
Then it also goes through some process. Or it does not. It is defined as "it" regardless of the
process "it" goes through. "It" is separate from a system of changes and relationships that are
"possible" for "it."(p.50)...’In the old model one assumes that there must first be "it" as one unit,
separate from how its effects in turn affect it...In the process we are looking at there is no
separate "it," no linear cause-effect sequence with "it" coming before its effects determine what
happens. So there is something odd here, about the time sequence. How can "it" be already
affected by affecting something, if it did not do the affecting before it is in turn affected?...With
the old assumption of fixed units that retain their identity, one assumes a division between it, and
its effects on others. (This "it" might be a part, a process, or a difference made.) In the old model 
it is only later, that the difference made to other units can in turn affect "it."(p.40)
Speaking to Ratcliffe’s causal  interaffecting organizational model of existential feeling, Gendlin
explains: 
If one assumes separate events, processes, or systems, one must then add their co-ordinations as one
finds them, as if unexpectedly...“Inter-affecting" and "coordination" are words that bring the old
assumption of a simple multiplicity, things that exist as themselves and are only then also related. So
we need a phrase that does not make sense in that old way. Let us call the pattern we have been
formulating "original inter-affecting". This makes sense only if one grasps that "they" inter-affect
each other before they are a they(p.22).
Gendlin’s organizational principle of  radical interaffecting, made possible by his Heideggerian
approach to temporality, exposes  the concept  of states ,  dispositions, and causal interactions
between felt and intentional factors founding Ratcliffe’s model as an abstraction derived from a
more primary, intricate and intimate process in which feelings and intentions, like Heidegger’s
attunement and understanding, are equi-primordial rather than one being causally oriented by the
other.
On the one hand,  cognition, often conceived as  propositional intentionality, is not simply
directedness toward or  an aiming at an object, or being about something. It is a transformation
and enrichment of a prior meaning context, a creative alteration of sense.
(Ratcliffe claims bodily feeling and intentional state are two sides of the same coin, but
nevertheless he still separates them . For instance: ”some instances of diagnosed depression will
most likely conform to cognitive  approaches, that they will involve systems of intentional states
rather than existential feelings.” )
“Supposedly cognizing the “external” things does not change them. Cognizing is only about them.
This “only about” assumes that our cognition does not change the behavior context, the situation
including what our scientific work is about.  But I will argue that it does change the behavior
space...It has not been clear how cognition is a bodily process. “Only about” has meant that cognition
happens in representations.” (Gendlin 2008)
On the other hand, bodily feeling is already a cognate sensing.”Currently it still clashes with our
habits of language to say “we think with the body.”   Gendlin doesn’t need to employ a notion of
feeling  as selective  hedonic reinforcement  of intentional organization, since it is temporality that
organizes implicit bodily meaning.  Feeling, as meaningful “sensed complexity”, “implicit
understanding sensed in living”, makes reference to implicit bodily organizational process and by
doing so contributes to the process as a further change within it.  “To feel something as an inner
object is a change.., not just a representation; feeling something makes a change in it.”(Emotions
in Therapy)
“We feel the change made by the actual environment occurring into the body's implied behavior
context. The feedback occurs into the implying which carries the sequence forward into further
implying and occurring, as our little model says. Behavior forms only as perceptions and feelings of
this kind.”(2008)
“Implying is not an occurring that will happen. It is not an occurring-not-yet. It does not occupy a
different time-position than the occurring. Rather, one implying encompasses all three linear time
positions, and does not occupy an additional linear time position of its own. (See A Process Model,
IVB. This is a more intricate model of time. It includes a kind of “future” and a kind of “past” that
are not linear positions. This time model can be reduced back to the liner model by considering just
occurring-occurring-occurring as if it were cut off from implying. “
Gendlin’s understanding of the body as sense creating via radical temporal organization locates
his proximity not only to Heidegger and Husserl, but to Merleau-Ponty.
 As Roald, Levin, and Køppe 2018 explain in their Merleau-Pontian challenge to bodily theories of
emotion:
“The body is inherently involved in the production of meaning, and subjectivity is constituted
intersubjectively or dialectically; thus there is always an element of alterity and familiarity
in experience. [The body] forms and informs consciousness and produces not just the
constraint conditions for consciousness, that is, sets limits for what it can be, but takes part in
creating its form.” Affective Incarnations: Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Challenge to Bodily Theories
of Emotion (Roald, T., Levin, K., & Køppe, S. (2018))
Merleau-Ponty defines an emotion as “ a variation in our relations with others and the world
which is expressed in our bodily attitude” (1964b, p. 53).”
Ratcliffe interprets this to mean that emotion is a change in one’s habitual mode of existential
feeling. “This points to a distinction between an emotional disturbance and a more mundane
experience of something as significant relative to some project or set of projects. “(Ratcliffe 2019)
However, for Merleau-Ponty, there is no pre-intentional disposition orienting experience, because
being disposed or oriented ( as  figure-ground structure of a gestalt field) only exists in intention,
as  variation. Perception, as the ground of experience,  only has being as self-transforming action. 
Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, as for Husserl, Gendlin and Heidegger,  temporality is the driving force
of affectivity and intentionality. 
“ In all uses of the word sens, we find the same fundamental notion of a being orientated or
polarized in the direction of what he is not, and thus we are always brought back to a conception of
the subject as ek-stase, and to a relationship of active transcendence between the subject and the
world.” (Phenomenology of Perception, p.499).
 “Action is, by definition, the violent transition from what I have to what I aim to have, from what I
am to what I intend to be.”, “When I say that I know and like  someone, I aim, beyond his qualities,
at an inexhaustible ground which may one day shatter the image that I have formed of him. This is
the price for there being things and ‘other people’ for us, not as the result of some illusion, but as
the result of a violent act which is perception itself. “ (Phenomenology of Perception, p.444)). 
Merleau-Ponty equates  intention with attention: 
“Attention is “a change of the structure of consciousness,  the establishment of a new dimension of
experience, the setting forth of an a priori... To pay attention is not merely further to elucidate
pre-existing data, it is to bring about a new articulation of them by taking them as figures. “(p.35)
“The miracle of consciousness consists in its bringing to light, through attention, phenomena which
re-establish the unity of the object in a new dimension at the very moment when they destroy it.
Thus attention is neither an association of images, nor the return to itself of thought already in
control of its objects, but the active constitution of a new object which makes explicit and articulate
what was until then presented as no more than an indeterminate horizon.”(p.35)
Conclusion:
I have argued in this paper that affective and intentional situatedness, understood by Ratcliffe as
globally patterned inter-causal states (existential feeling),  functions  as a  structure of
entrenchment and self-conservation,  inhering in itself  and resisting  its own transformation. A
global change in bodily feeling is thus required to infuse  supposedly stagnant affective-
intentional narratives with a new direction and meaning, disrupt entrenched patterns, dissolve the
conditioning glue holding them together,  reveal their contingency and open up new possibilities. 
Ratcliffe sees the role of Husserl’s transcendental reduction and Heidegger’s primordial anxiety as
such disrupters.  I have claimed, instead, that rather than a contingent island of static structure in a
sea of indeterminacy, an affective - intentional attunement  is the  essence of temporal becoming
as  self-transformative dynamic,  hiding within the supposedly static moment of Ratcliffe’s
existential feeling state. The role of the epoche and authentic anxiety is to reveal this intimate,
intricate foreign-familiar binary of movement concealed within naive naturalized models of
psychological functioning. If the purpose of the epoche and primordial anxiety is, as Ratcliffe
says, to bring us face to face with indeterminacy, then it is not an indeterminacy outside of, before, 
after, or surrounding stable structures of situatedness, but rather an indeterminacy at the core of
those structures themselves. But Befindlichkeit at the same time evinces a radical self-belonging
and irreducible world-connectedness obscured by and undiscoverable when thought in terms of 
Ratcliffe’s schematisms.        
In failing to ground affective experience in radical temporality , Ratcliffe’s conception of mood as
causally configured state renders his approach an outsider’s view. By  the time Ratcliffe has
noticed what he calls a shift in mood, an intricate process of change of  felt meaning has already
taken place, both within thematically harmonious and confused temporally unfolding episodes of 
affective experience.  
Not recognizing this fundamental co-dependence between  transitivity and identity leads to
reification of each  pole of experience.  If dispositions to act and acts themselves, being and
becoming, feeling and intention, can be treated as separate moments, then their relations are
rendered secondary and arbitrary, requiring causations and glues to piece them together.  
Ratcliffe writes: “This default ‘style’ (minimal self) of anticipation is not specific to any particular
life-structure, any particular configuration of cares, concerns, commitments, projects, and
pastimes. It is, if you  like, the glue needed to hold any such structure together, any kind of
world.”(Trauma, Language and Trust, forthcoming)
The glue that holds together Ratcliffe’s minimal self, interaffecting causation,  is a secondary
concept of organization, a naturalized  abstraction derived  from the primary termporal
structuration of affectivity-connation. 
What DeJaegher, critiquing Gallagher’s primary intersubjectity account , writes in that narrower
context, could apply to Ratcliffe’s  general orientation,; “ first we carve nature up at artificial
joints – we split mind and body apart – and then we need to fasten the two together again, a task
for which the notion of embodiment is, according to Sheets-Johnstone’s assessment, used as a
kind of glue . But glueing the two back together does not bring back the original ‘‘integrity and
nature of the whole” (De Jaegher 2009, Sheets-Johnstone ,in press). Unlike first generation
cognitivims, Ratcliffe begins from interaction, but an interaction that is grounded in separated
moments of subject and object, feeling and intention, being and becoming, time and stasis.
The radically temporal account of affect introduced by Husserl and transformed in different ways
by Merleau-Ponty, Gendlin and Heidegger,  implies a rejection of two long-standing assumptions
supporting the depiction of affect and cognition as distinct states. Contrary to these assumptions:
1) Intentional experience does not need to be pushed or pulled into action, or change of direction,
by extrinsic reinforcement contingencies. Every moment of experience is already intrinsically
affective (qualitatively self-displacing), assuring that even the most apparently non-emotive,
‘rational’, reflective type of awareness, such as supposedly characterizes affectively neutral
empirical accounts, qualitatively, intuitively, hedonically transforms the meaning of what it
references. Feelings belong to, operate within, carry forward, and transform what are called
conceptual meanings . This qualitatively transformative effect in moment to moment experience is
often subtle enough to go unnoticed, explaining the apparent analytical stability and
inter-subjective objectivity attributed to empirical phenomena, the allegedly self-perpetuating
coherence of linguistic narratives, and even the illusion of a stable ongoing pre-reflective
self-awareness, minimal self or reflexive ‘feeling of being’.
2) ‘Raw’ affect is intrinsically   intentional. So-called bodily sensations of feeling not only
manifest the characteristics of metaphoricity and narrative consistency traditionally associated
with conceptual thought, but in fact are not categorically distinguishable from what has been
called conceptual meaning in any stable way. 
Prior to any notion of cognition and affect as distinguishable constructs, within and beyond such
terms as cognitive states and bodily affective signs, lies a universe of  self-exceeding senses,
modulations, aspects, variations, ways of working. Not variations or modulations of STATES but
modulations of modulations.
If feeling, understood this new way, IS the very core of so-called conceptual and perceptual
thought, merging narrative-thematic consistency and global self-transformation, the subjective and
the objective, the felt and the understood, in the same gesture, then the presumed partial
independence of rationality and affect vanishes, and the distinction re-emerges as aspects inherent
in each event. The inter-affecting of context and novelty which defines an event simultaneously
produces a fresh, particular modulation of change (empirical aspect) and a unique momentum
(hedonic component) of self-transformation. From this vantage, the valuative, hedonic (the
perceived goodness or badness of things), aesthetic aspect of experience, underlying
‘non-emotional’ appraisals as well as our sadnesses, fears and joys, simply IS our vicissitudes of
momentum of sense-making through  situations, rather than arising from causal feedback loops.
Affective valences are contractions and expansions, coherences and incoherences, accelerations
and regressions, consonances and dissonances, expressing how intimately and harmoniously we
are able to anticipate and relate to, and thus how densely, richly, intensely we are able to move
through, new experience. If we can believe that a unique qualitative moment of momentum,
ranging from the confused paralysis of unintelligibility to the exhilaration of dense transformative
movement, is intrinsic to ALL events, then perhaps there is no need to attribute the origin of
aesthetic pleasures and pains to the functioning of a limited class of entities like bodily affects,
even if it is understandable why this kind of assumption has survived for so long in psychology .
From the standpoint of verbal expressivity, what has traditionally been called emotion often
appears to be a minimalist art, because it is the situational momentum of experiencing slowing or
accelerating so rapidly that feelings seem to distill meaning down to a bare inarticulate essence.
When the momentum of our reflective thought shifts in such dramatic ways (acceleratively
enriched in joyful comprehension, impoverished in grief, ambivalent in fear, alternately
disappointed and confident in anger), such so-called emotional events may appear to be a species
apart from conceptual reason, a blind intuitive force (surge, glow, twinge, sensation, arousal,
energy) invading, conditioning and orienting perceptual and conceptual thought from without as a
background field. It is said that such ‘raw’ or primitive feeling is bodily-physiological,
pre-reflective and non-conceptual, contentless hedonic valuation, innate, passive, something we
are overcome by. At other times, situational change may be intermediate, just modulated and
gradual enough that content seems to perpetuate itself in self-cohering narratives. Such situations
have been called rational, voluntary, factual, reflective, stable, conceptual, propositional, rational,
logical, theoretical, non-aesthetic. However, as I have said, these dichotomies: hedonic versus
reflective, voluntary versus involuntary, conceptual versus pre-reflective bodily-affective, are not
effectively understood as  reciprocally causal innate and learned associations between perceptions
and body states; they are relative variations in the momentum of a contextually unfolding process
which is always, at the same time, within the same event, intentional and affective.
Am I suggesting that emotion be thought as a ‘cognitive’ appraisal, cut off from bodily sensation,
movement and expression? On the contrary, it is precisely the treatment of cognition, bodily
sensation and expression as separately pre-existing processes (even when treated as mutually
structuring each other via ‘intentional-affective’ syntheses) which I am questioning. The point
isn’t that bodily responses to experience via such avenues as the endocrine, autonomic nervous
system and the motor pathways are irrelevant or peripheral to the intentional experience of
emotion, feeling and mood, but that, whether we talking about the experience of so-called
conceptual appraisal or bodily sensation, the phenomenological scene of affect (or any other
aspect of bio-psycho-social functioning) does not depend on an arbitrary concatenation or mutual
conditioning between discrete components. Prinz(2004), Colombetti and Thompson(2006),
Damasio(1999) and others deny such a thing as a totally disembodied emotion, arguing that the
feeling of emotion is affected in degrees concordantly with the severity of damage to avenues of
connection with the body. I support their larger claim that experiential processes, including what
are called cognitive and affective, function as radically, contextually inter-relational. However, I
want to turn their views around a bit. Feeling does not depend on the fact that the brain, as a
spatial locale and repository of temporary states of content, always has some access to the body, as
a separate locale with semi-independent contents.
I have said that feeling functions from within so-called reflective thought, and that bodily affect is
intentional. But if both the former and latter are true , it is not because body sensation structures
cognition(or vice-versa). Rather, it is because these stratifying abstractions are but inadequately
formulated moments of a process of sense-making uniting the hedonic and the intentional prior to
any distinction between, or intertwining of, mind and body. Before I could speak of the
occurrence of emotion as mental appraisals structured and conditioned by a background field of
physiological energetics and behavioral expressions, I would have to re-figure all of these modes,
what would be referred to as the “motoric”, the “sensate”, the “cognitive”, as unstable
metaphorical figures emerging contextually out of each other over the course of an indissociably
intentive-affective global movement of experience which would imply the unraveling of the basis
of categorical distinctions currently orienting the understanding of these terms.
When I am frightened, whether I focus on my attitude toward the world, my rapid heartbeat, my
facial expression or bodily preparation for action, each of these aspects emerge out of each other
as a fully reflective, metaphoric carrying forward and further transforming of the deepening
implications of this tentative, confused situation. All these aspects already belong to, and in fact
have their meaning ENTIRELY defined as variations-continuations of the thematic unfolding of
my sense of the emerging threat, subtly remaking my entire past while always maintaining a sense,
no matter how surprising, unpredictable or disturbing a new present appears, of implicatory
belonging to this prior history.
Intermingled with my wandering in and out of significant shifts in experiential momentum, from
doubts, terrors, and confusions to later confidences and contentments, will be more subtly
self-transforming moments whose continual intuitive shifts of meaning, purpose and affective
momentum are hidden so effectively that it may fool me into believing that this more plodding
progress of comprehension represents the appearance of a different species from that of
pronounced feeling, the realm of affectively neutral (or constant) cognitive states. However, such
entities as narrative schemes and conceptual forms may in fact have no actual status other than as
empty abstractions invoked by individuals who nevertheless, in their actual use of these terms,
immediately and unknowingly transform the hedonically felt senses operating within (and
defining) such abstractions in subtle but global ways. Feeling, the event, the inter-bleeding of
subject and object, transformation without form: all of these terms reference the same irreducible
‘unit’ of experience, concealed by but overrunning what  bodies, dispositions  and other states are
supposed to do. A ‘single’ state (whether so-called conceptual or bodily-affective) is already a
panoply of intimately changing variations and momenta of felt meanings, in(as) the instant it is
accessed, infusing the allegedly conceptual with feeling (and the sensate with intentionality) from
within its very core, embodied before any consultation wit h a separate bodily ‘outside’.
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